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Abstract/Résumé
This paper considers the threat of stricter regulation as a
policy instrument to enhance innovation into cleaner technology. It is
argued that in some contexts the government would find it optimal to
regulate with positive probability but not with certainty. In those contexts
the optimal policy is indeed made of regulatory threats; furthermore, we
show that it is time-consistent, credible, involving little information, and
immune to ex post renegotiation.
Ce document considère la menace dune réglementation
environnementale plus stricte en tant quinstrument de politique
économique visant à stimuler linnovation. Il est démontré que, dans
certains cas, le gouvernement préférerait réglementer avec une probabilité
positive mais pas avec certitude. Dans ces situations, la politique optimale
est en effet constituée de menaces de réglementation; il est de plus
démontré quelle est cohérente dans le temps, crédible, peu exigeante en
rcimonieuse et robuste à la renégociation.
Theminister initially set 1993 as the deadline before enforcing tougher rules. This time schedule was not
1
fulfilled, however, which illustrates once more the difficulty of following precise calendars in this area.
Belowwe insist that regulatory policies should be time-consistent, i.e. immune to being revised when the
deadline comes.
See, e.g., Downing and White (1986), Milliman and Prince (1989), and Carraro and Siniscalco (1991).
2
Ratcheting refers to a situation that is well-known to prisoners of war. If they work hard initially, they
3
elicit information on their working capabilities which may be used by the camp authorities to increase their
future workload. In the absence of precommitment, the equilibrium outcome thus involves suboptimal
effort in the first period. Ratcheting has been studied in the context of environmental regulation by Yao
(1988).
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1. Introduction
Corrective policies for environmental externalities may take a number of
forms. The ones most commonly analyzed in the literature are emission taxes,
emission-abatement subsidies, direct regulation through technical standards and
tradeable permits [see Baumol and Oates (1988)]. Little attention has been given so
far to the threat of environmental regulation. In a recent paper, Glazer and McMillan
(1992) argue, however, that Regulation does not always appear as an unexpected
event, and threatened firms may alter their behavior in order to reduce the probability
of regulation. For example, when German environment minister Klaus Töpfer
threatened to force automakers to take back the 2 million cars that are scrapped in
Germany each year, Germanys automakers, in particular Volkswagen, ran to establish
efficient disassembly systems [Schmidheiny (1992)]. This paper therefore examines1
the transition process towards new environmental standards and the innovation effort
of a monopolist threatened by a change of environmental regulation.
There is now a growing literature on the appropriate incentives for
environmental innovation. Each policy instrument raises specific problems, but some2
issues are generic. First, a government attempting to enforce socially desirable norms
on private firms is likely to face information-elicitation problems [see Laffont and
Tirole (1993) and references therein]. For instance, when firms have private
information on the cost of compliance to new regulation and regulators cannot
precommit to a future course of action, the well-known ratchet effect appears [see,
e.g., Weitzman (1980), Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985), and Rey and Salanié
(1990)]. Second, environmental regulation affects technology choices, and the3
question of whether tighter standards can be held responsible for reduced productivity
growth has attracted a considerable amount of attention, particularly in the United
States. Finally, independently of the information structure, government enforcement
of social objectives in the absence of precommitment raises time-consistency issues
[see Malik (1991)]: if the time of regulatory change is conditioned on the domestic
industrys readiness, a perverse incentive is created and foot-dragging may be encour-
3aged; if, on the other hand, the time of regulatory change is set independently of the
industrys state of preparation, a government with industrial policy concerns will want
to revise its choices if the industry is not ready when time for change comes. It is on
this latter issue that we focus.
We consider the problem of a government facing pressure to adopt stricter
pollutant emission standards while polluting firms insist that they need time to develop
alternatives to current technologies. The context is one of a small open economy. In
a country taking a leading position in setting new environmental standards, the
standard-setting process is likely to involve extensive bargaining between producers
and government agencies [see Spulber (1989)]. By contrast, in a small (follower)
country, foreign standards, especially if they come from a large country, constitute an
exogenous reference. The trade-off faced by the government is the following. Simply
waiting for the domestic industry to develop its own technology for complying with
socially desirable standards is not a solution if developing the technology does not
provide privately adequate returns. On the other hand, imposing at once the desired
standard may put an excessive burden on the regulated industry. An incentive scheme
is required, but if such a scheme takes account, explicitely or implicitely, of the
industrys preparation, a perverse incentive is created which ultimately hinders
innovation.
There is a close analogy between this problem and the more general one of
standards harmonization [see Dean (1991) and Krutilla (1991)]. To some extent
adopting foreign environmental standards can also be viewed as a process of trade
liberalization. Time-consistency issues are likely to arise in this context and were
recently analyzed by Matsuyama (1990). What makes the problem of environmental
regulation distinct and interesting, however, is that it combines these issues with issues
of incentives for innovation.
The conflicts and trade-offs that we point at above are studied here within the
framework of an infinite-horizon game of perfect information between the government
and domestic industry, represented by a single firm. The game is stochastic, as the
firms innovation effort is subject to uncertain success. In a game, the incentive
scheme that we seek to derive takes the form of an equilibrium (i.e. time consistent)
strategy profile. We impose three additional requirements on this incentive scheme:
that it should not involve non-credible threats  i.e. be subgame perfect, that it
should be robust to collective deviations  i.e. be renegotiation-proof, and that it
should be simple in terms of informational and memory requirements.
We show that an incentive scheme satisfying simultaneously all these
requirements can be implemented as the only perfect Markov equilibrium of the game.
Regulatory uncertainty emerges as an incentive device that the government uses to
induce the domestic firm to invest in the development of new technology. The
probability of regulation decreases over time, however, as the firm successfully
completes intermediate stages of the technology-development process. Therefore the
The reason is that if the government regulates, the domestic firm has no option but to adopt an existing
4
foreign technology through a licensing agreement. This implies strategic choices for the domestic firm which
preclude simultaneously pursuing the development of its own technology.
The assumption of fixed intensity of R&D effort is also used by Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz and Tirole
5
(1983) and by Choi (1991).
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outcome is characterized by an escalating commitment of the government in favor of
the firms development effort. In addition, as the private return of the technology
development project increases, the probability of regulation goes down, i.e. the
incentive scheme becomes softer, and the probability of completion increases.
Therefore, the inefficiency associated with a positive probability of regulation is
reduce for (privately) better projects. Finally, as the governments preference for
immediate regulation a proxy for environmentalist pressure  increases, the firms
probability of development goes up. But as the governments preference for
successful development of a domestic technology  a proxy for industrial-policy
concerns  increases, the firms probability of development goes down. In other
words, governments that care too much too openly about domestic competitiveness are
taken hostage.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2.
Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks.
2. The Model
One stage of the game in extensive form is depicted in figure 1. The players
are the government and a domestic firm. At the beginning of each period, the
government moves first by choosing to enact (r) or to delay (r) ) a strict standard
concerning the emission of pollutants. If the government regulates, the game ends ;4
if it does not, the firms node is reached. The firm may pursue (d) or not pursue (÷)
the development of its own cleaner technology . If it chooses not to develop the5
technology, one period elapses and the game starts again. If it chooses to develop, a
chance node is reached, as success in developing the new technology is uncertain.
Whatever happens, one period elapses. If the firm is lucky, the game jumps to a new
state with lower emissions. If it is not, the game starts all over again.
Stochastic models of innovation with multi-stage development processes have been studied by Grossman
6
and Shapiro (1987) and Harris and Vickers (1987) among others. Both papers study R&D races between
two firms and allow for variable R&D intensities. We consider here the simple case where there is only one
home firm capable of developing the alternative technology, as in Grossman and Shapiro (1986).
5
Figure 1. The stage game.
Reducing emissions e to the level compatible with the strict standard takes
two stages: the firm must first go from an initial state of high emissions (e = h) through
a medium yet unsatisfactory level (e = m) before reaching the low, appropriate level
(e = R). The probabilities p and q governing transitions of the emission process 6e >
t
generate the following Markov matrix:
When state R is reached, the game ends after a trivial move by the government
consisting of regulating.6
Until the firm has reached state R and unless the government has introduced
the new regulation, the firm and the government receive instantaneous payoffs
normalized to zero. The firm incurs flow costs of K in state h and k in state m in each
See Maskin and Tirole (1989) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for formal definitions, examples, and
7
references. Markov strategies are plausible in the present context, because failure does not carry any
information on the chances of success. If the parameters of the development process were to be learnt over
time, as in a bandit problem, restricting the strategy space to Markov strategies would be more
problematic.
6
(2)
period where it decides to pursue the development of the cleaner technology. Lets
assume that the government and the firm share the same discount factor * = 1/(1+r).
If the government regulates before the new technology development is
completed, the government and the firm receive v) and u) respectively. If state R is
achieved, the government and the firm receive respective payoffs v and u (discounted* *
by one period, since the firm moves last).
The firms and governments respective preferences over payoffs are
represented by the following inequalities:
The firms first inequality means that early regulation, before its own technology is
developed, is the worst of all outcomes; the second inequality means that an outcome
where new standards are imposed when the firm has succeeded is best and is in
particular better than the status quo, for it gives the domestic firm a leadership position
in the new technology. The governments first inequality implies that forcing
regulation on the unprepared firm is better than the status quo; the second inequality
says that the government internalizes the firms objectives to some extent, by putting
a premium on having the firm prepared.
In general, a strategy for either player is a sequence of functions mapping
game histories up to any time t into a number in the interval [0,1]. This number is, for
the firm, the probability that it develops the cleaner technology, and for the
government, the probability of enacting the strict standards. Now, a Markov strategy
for either player is a function mapping the state space E = {h, m, R} into the interval
[0,1]. That is, such a strategy conditions only on the current state e of the
t
development process (instead of conditioning on the whole game history) and must
specify identical moves for periods where the process is in the same state . We will7
denote by X the probability that the government regulates when the state is h, and by
x the probability that it regulates when the state is m. Similarly, we denote by Y the
probability that the firm develops when the state is h, and by y the probability that it
develops when the state is m. X, x, Y and y will be either zero or one for pure
strategies. As a last piece of notation, the regulate and dont regulate moves are
Rigorous derivation of this result and of many others contained in this section is easy but tedious. Proofs
8
are therefore omitted. The interested reader is of course welcome to get a copy of them from the authors.
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labeled R and R¯ respectively in state h, and r and r) in state m; and the develop and
dont develop moves are labeled D and ö in state h and d and ÷ in state m.
3. Results
We shall focus on Markov strategies. This ensures that any equilibrium will
involve simple action rules. As the government moves first in each period, it cannot
condition on the firms effort choice in the current period; the Markov assumption also
implies that it will not condition on the firms choice of effort in past periods. Hence,
the governments strategy involves a minimal amount of memory.
If one solves the game using dynamic programming, the Markov restriction
also simplifies the work. Because history does not matter, payoffs which otherwise
would have to be written in full over the infinite horizon take on a simple recursive
structure. It can be shown that there is a unique Markov perfect equilibrium for each
given set of parameters.8
In state m, the set of parameters can be partitioned into three regions.
B Let region n be the one where parameters satisfy:
0 < k # *qu .*
In this region there is a the unique equilibrium (r),d), in pure strategies: the government
does not regulate and the firm expends effort into developing the technology. The cost
of development k is sufficiently low for the firm to develop without any incentive from
the government.
B Let region P be defined by the inequalities:
*qu < k < *q(u - ã) .* *
Private development costs k are higher in this region and an incentive is needed. This
incentive takes the form of a threat to impose stricter pollution standards. At
equilibrium the government threatens to regulate with a probability that is just
sufficient to induce the firm to expend development efforts with positive frequency.
The governments probability of surprise regulation creates, for the firm, an
incentive to get out of the current state m into the safe state R. The only way to do this
is to put in effort to develop the new technology.
In this mixed-strategy equilibrium, the two randomized strategies support
each other in the usual way. Given the governments probability of regulating, the
8firm is just indifferent between developing and not developing its technology. It, in
turn, picks the probability of developing that makes the government just indifferent
between regulating and not regulating.
Randomization devices are common in enforcement situations. For instance,
auditing frequencies, whether by tax authorities, customs, or firm headquarters, are
designed in such a way as to appear random to the auditees. Of course, everyone
could be audited everyday, but this would be prohibitively costly. Similar reasoning
applies here. Regulating has a cost to the government: the difference between the
equilibrium payoff and v). Therefore the government wants to apply only necessary
force.
B Finally, let region R be characterized by
*q(u - ã) # k .*
In this region the cost of development k is too high. The only equilibrium is in pure
strategies - (r,d) - and it has the firm not developing and the government regulating.)
There are three similar parameter regions in state h, determined by the relative size
of the first-period development cost K. Let us call these regionsM, O,Q respectively.
Combining the corresponding restrictions on the parameters with those defining the
regions in state m yields the nine scenarios which are displayed in table 1.
Regions in state h // Regions in state m
N: 0 # k # *qu* P: *qu*< k
< *q(u*-ã)
R: *q(u*-ã) # k
M: 0 # K # *pu firm always tries to
innovate
inconsistent case government
O: *pu < K
<*p(u-ã)
regulatory threat
in state h only;
firm always tries to
innovate in state m
persistent
regulatory threat
that becomes
weaker in state m
regulates
Q: *p(u-ã) # K government regulates right away
Table 1. Scenarios.
Some scenarios are internally inconsistent and can therefore be disposed of;
some others imply trivial outcomes. First, regionQ (and scenarios Qn,QP,QR)
corresponds to the noninteresting case where the government regulates right away, at
A proof of this can be obtained from the authors on request.
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A qualitatively similar result would be obtained in a game of incomplete information with two types of
10
government, a tough one with a high probability of regulation and a soft one with a low probability of
regulation. The firm would then update downward its prior about the probability of regulation with each
period where regulation does not take place. The main difference is that the time path of the probability of
regulation would be smooth rather than decreasing in discrete steps.
9
the start of the game. In region R, the government regulates for sure as soon as the
game reaches state m. Scenarios MR and OR then produce also a trivial outcome.
Since the government must regulate when state m is reached and interim payoffs are
0, why wait? The government has to regulate immediately in state h. Another trivial
case is the one implicit in scenarioMn. Here, the government never needs to regulate,
for the firm always attempts to develop its technology. Scenario MP, finally, is
inconsistent. It can be shown that there exists no pair of costs (K,k) satisfying all the
inequalities that define this region.9
We are therefore left with two interesting scenarios: On and OP. Under both
of these scenarios, equilibrium strategies in state h are probabilities (mixed strategies).
B In scenario On, the private return to the development project becomes positive after
a first success. The structure of the incentive scheme is then that the government
commits implicitely, in state m, to wait as long as necessary for the firm to bring its
new technology to state R. This is what drives the firms incentive to put in the effort
in state h. Because in state h, the threat of surprise regulation is looming, the firm tries
to get into the safe state m. Note that the regulatory process can be captured by the
firm in the sense that it may take an arbitrarily long time to get to state R. This is not
a moral hazard problem, however, since it appears only in a state where the private
return to the project has turned positive.
B In scenario OP, the private return to technology development is still negative in
statem. The firm then always needs to be pushed in the back. The incentive scheme
takes the form of a threat (probability) to regulate that becomes softer (lower) after a
first success. Accordingly, the firm expends effort with a higher frequency when state
m is reached.
This result  escalating commitment towards the domestic technology 
can be generalized to more than two states. What it means is that even if the private
return is negative at the projects ultimate stage, the incentive needed for a given level
of effort becomes weaker after each transition. This is a direct consequence of the fact
that the value of the dynamic program is increasing with each successful transition.
Stated differently, the probability of regulation conditional on no regulation having
taken place the discrete-time equivalent of a hazard rate  is decreasing in steps .10
10
(3)
(4)
(5)
3.1 Comparative statics
Comparative statics can now be performed in the relevant regions. This
helps understand the intuition of the equilibrium as well as its predictive power.
B First, if the private value of the technology development project increases, i.e. either
k, q or u increase, then the incentive scheme becomes softer. Let ) = k+qã-*qu , we* *
have that:
B Second, an increase in the governments industrial-policy preference reduces the
firms effort. Formally, let y by the (equilibrium) probability that the firm expends
effort on developing its own technology in state m, then
B Last, an increase in the government valuation of immediate regulation increases the
firms effort. That is:
The incentive scheme thus behaves in a manner similar to that of a negotiated
settlement: when the governments outside opportunities improve through v) (equation
(4)), the settlement tilts in favor of the government, and conversely if its gain from
cooperation (v - v)) increases (equation (3)). Furthermore, the inefficiency associated*
with a positive probability of regulation goes down when the project improves in the
sense of a higher probability of success, a lower cost of development or a higher final
prize (equation (2)).
One could possibly construct supergame equilibria using closed-loop strategies, in the spirit of the Folk
11
theorem. However, such equilibria would impose additional informational requirements on the game  for
instance, that the government observes whether or not the firm actually puts in the development effort.
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3.2 Renegotiation
Whenever a repeated-game equilibrium is based on punishments that are
costly to the punisher, the question arises as to whether such punishments are
renegotiable. Here, the incentive scheme rests on the governments threat of
regulation. Suppose that after the suitable randomization, the government draws the
regulate card. Shouldnt it renegotiate with the firm and start all over again? Note
first that, because the equilibrium is in Markov strategies, it satisfies the criterion of
subgame-consistency [Selten (1973), Selten and Harsanyi(1988)]. This criterion
requires that play in subgames that are isomorphic be identical. Here, all subgames
played in state i, i = h,m, are isomorphic; play in those subgames is necessarily
identical when strategies are Markov, which is why payoffs take on a very simple
recursive structure. In region OP, the equilibrium is unique and is therefore trivially
renegotiation-proof. In region On, the continuation equilibrium for the subgame
played in state m dominates all other (non-perfect) equilibria; therefore, there is no
credible deviation in the sense of Abreu and Pierce (1989) . Each equilibrium is11
therefore renegotiation-proof in its region.
4. Conclusion
Tradeoffs involving industrial policy, technical change and environmental
standards have been relatively unexplored in spite of their importance. We have
considered the problem of a government balancing a desire for stricter environmental
standards  whether politically motivated or not  against a concern for the
competitive position of home firms. One way out of the dilemma is to encourage
domestic technological solutions to the environmental problem through an incentive
scheme. A government that is not willing to throw subsidies at the problem will want
to use the threat of stiff environmental standards as the basic incentive device: that is
what we propose. Our approach is to set up a few simple criteria: simplicity, time-
consistency, subgame perfection, and renegotiation-proofness, and to find a scheme
that fulfills all of them simultaneously. Time-consistency (on the equilibrium path)
suggests that the scheme should be derived as the Nash equilibrium of an appropriate
noncooperative game. Simplicity in turn suggests the use of a well-known restriction
on strategies: that they be Markov, i.e. memoryless. Subgame-perfection requires that
the government would not use non-credible threats; i.e., that the strategies be time-
consistent off the equilibrium path. Finally, renegotiation-proofness requires that the
12
scheme could not be renegotiated by the government and the domestic firm to avoid
threats being carried out.
The scheme that we derive takes the form of probabilities of regulation that
decrease over time, as the firm successfully completes intermediate stages of the
technology-development process. The value of the firms dynamic program is
increasing over time in steps; if and when that value turns positive, the government
commits not to regulate until the firm successfully completes the final stage. Therefore
the outcome is characterized by regulatory uncertainty and by an escalating
commitment of the government in favor of the firms development effort. The
escalating commitment should not be seen in terms of financial resources, but rather
in terms of political support. Note that the use of mixed strategies is not a mere
computational result. Its intuition is based on the idea that the governments
regulatory instrument is indivisible; creating uncertainty is a way of dosing it.
The scheme reacts to changes in the parameters in an intuitive way. The
threat of regulation diminishes and the probability of completion increases when the
private return to developing the domestic technology goes up. The inefficiency due
to undesired regulation is then minimal for the best projects. If pressure to regulate
at once grows, the firms probability of development goes up. If the government bows
more to industrial lobbies, on the other hand, the firms probability of development
decreases. Hence, governments that care too much too openly about domestic
competitiveness are taken hostage, and strong endorsement by the government of a
domestic firms opposition to international harmonization might in fact contribute to
the failure of key development projects.
13
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